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Abstract—In this paper, we coin the term Policy Enforcement
as a Service (PEPS), which enables the provision of innovative
inter-layer and inter-domain Access Control. We leverage the
architecture of Software-Defined-Network (SDN) to introduce
a common network-level enforcement point, which is made
available to a range of access control systems. With our PEPS
model, it is possible to have a ‘defense in depth’ protection
model and drop unsuccessful access requests before engaging
the data provider (e.g. a database system). Moreover, the current
implementation of access control within the ‘trusted’ perimeter
of an organization is no longer a restriction so that the potential
for novel, distributed and cooperative security services can be
realized. We conduct an analysis of the security requirements and
technical challenges for implementing Policy Enforcement as a
Service. To illustrate the benefits of our proposal in practice, we
include a report on our prototype PEPS-enabled location-based
access control.
I. INTRODUCTION
With Software-Defined-Network (SDN), the separation of
control and data plane and programmability in the network
enable provision of enhanced security systems. A diverse
set of proposals have emerged that exploit the architecture
of SDN, and specifically the network-wide view of SDN
controllers, to implement reactive monitoring and automated
response systems. Recently, an emerging body of literature is
shaped around the idea of using SDN to introduce innovative
security services. We follow the latter approach and leverage
the capabilities of SDN in moving towards a new model of
access control enforcement, which could potentially open the
door to a range of new types of security services.
Access control systems limit the operations of legitimate
users [19]. The main components of an access control sys-
tem include Policy Decision Point (PDP), Policy Repository
(PR) and Policy Enforcement Point (PEP). Accordingly, an
authorization flow involves retrieving the user access request
by PDP, inquiry the PR for matching policies and enforcing
the decision by PEP. Figure 1 illustrates a typical access
control process flow between a Database Management System
(DBMS), as the Data Provider (DP), and a user at a remote
network, as the Data Requestor (DR). An access request by a
DR is sent from the DR network to the DP network, where
the DBMS makes the access decisions and enforces them. In
This is a copy of the paper accepted at IEEE NFV-SDN’16. An extended
work based on this paper will be submitted to a journal.
Fig. 1: A typical access control process flow between a Data
Provider (DP) and Data Requestor (DR) located in separate
networks.
other words, with this setup, an access request reaches DR
at application-layer and only then is decided about. Hence,
an attacker is allowed to engage the system and its hosting
network and possibly execute certain types of attacks such as
Denial of Service (DoS) or port scanning.
In this paper, we propose to leverage the capabilities
brought by SDN to introduce programmable network-level
policy enforcement points, which application-layer services
may subscribe to. The extra enforcement points serve to create
a ‘defense in depth’ [3, p. 308] model of protection and
improve the protection of services hosted in enterprise-like
networks. PEPS enables applications such as DBMS to enforce
dynamic access control policies both at a lower-level (i.e.
network-level enforcement rather than application-level) and
closer to the DR’s network (i.e. inter-domain enforcement). In
effect, PEPS enables authorized system resources to push pre-
approved policies to a purpose-built SDN application, which
enforces these policies at the level of SDN switches. We coin
Policy Enforcement Point as a Service (PEPS) for this model
of enforcement.
Referring to Figure 1, with PEPS, instead of waiting for the
requests to reach the DBMS’s PEP, the DBMS may instruct the
network to drop requests originated from a specific network
address for a certain period. Similarly, for Quality of Service
(QoS) purposes the DBMS may instruct the firewall to adjust
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traffic volume forwarded to it. Moreover, if the two network-
domains were to collaborate, the DBMS may push dynamic
and pre-approved policies to the DR’s network and block
unauthorized access requests either pro-actively or reactively.
For example, access requests from ‘non-secure’ areas of a
building destined to the DBMS may be dropped as early as
entering the DR’s network. We remind that in defense in
depth model of protection, the outer-layer defenses may be
less reliable than the inner-layers. Hence, if, for any reason,
the DR’s network fails to ensure to the remote policies, the
standard DR’s PEP is still in effect.
The resulting protection with PEPS is significantly different
and novel compared to status-quo. In fact, from an access
control viewpoint, the extra enforcement points at SDN’s data
plane, facilitates moving towards distributed and cooperative
enforcement of access control for application and services.
PEPS also motivates a new line of thought in access control,
which is deploying verifiable protection points beyond the
trusted perimeter of an organization.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section §II
we briefly revise background information on Access Control
and SDN security. Thereafter, in §III, we elaborate on our
motivation and preliminary technical requirements for imple-
menting PEPS. In §IV, we report on our prototype imple-
mentation of a PEPS-enabled location-based access control
(LBAC) system. The advantages of our LBAC compared to
state-of-the-art is discussed to motivate further investigation
of various applications of PEPS. We conclude this paper
specifying our work-in-progress and outlining suggestions for
future work.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Access Control
Every user’s attempt to interact with protected resources is
mediated by access control - the oldest information security
mechanisms. During the last decade, an increasing number of
major data leakage incidents are associated with the failure
of access control [8]. Security researchers [17], [25], [27],
associate this to the incompatibility of currently implementable
access control with today’s requirements. Hence, an increasing
number of researchers are investigating innovative proposals
to change this condition [9]. One of the promising directions is
the interaction of access control with other security services.
For example, Crampton et al. propose integrating intrusion
detection systems with access control systems [6].
Distributed access control is a fairly recent trend in access
control. For example, in [24], authors propose having multiple
principals defining the policies for PDP. Nevertheless, the en-
forcement is through a single trusted reference monitor. Digital
Rights Management (DRM) [22] is another example, which is
constituted of distributed enforcement. With DRM, the client-
side enforcement is, in fact, an extra point of enforcement
that facilitates a more granular control over information.
DRM is well-recongized and appreciated by industry, and its
architecture has been inspiring for our work.
B. Software-Defined-Network Security
SDN Security literature may be split into two main cate-
gories, securing the Software-Defined-Network itself or lever-
aging the capabilities of this technology for security services.
In [20], Scott-Hayward et al. provide a categorization of the
security issues associated with the SDN framework, and detail
the body of literature focussed on solutions to these threats.
The security requirements of PEPS defined in §3.3 rely on
such solutions.
On the other hand, SDN facilitates the provision of reactive
and automated monitoring, analysis and response systems. The
key SDN characteristics contributing here are the network-
wide view for centralized monitoring [2] and the programma-
bility of SDN to redirect selected network traffic through
middleboxes (see [4], [10], and [18] for examples). Along
with the improvement of traditional security solutions via
SDN, novel security services are also built on top of SDN.
For example, [11] uses SDN to develop an architecture that
enables residential internet customization, which could be used
to secure household appliances. [15] and [21] also introduce
innovative services.
Recently, a few number of solutions extend the Authen-
tication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) functionality
using the SDN controller and focus on identity management
and authentication mechanisms (e.g. [14] and [7], [23]). Our
PEPS model is a network-level access control implementation
deployed at the SDN data plane.
III. POLICY ENFORCEMENT AS A SERVICE
A. Motivation
Every organization has a number of systems equipped with
their own access control mechanism, e.g. file systems, fire-
walls, location-detection, etc. The access control component of
these systems operates independently. Hence, if any of these
PEP fail then unauthorized access to data is inevitable. As
mentioned in II-A, distributed reference monitors have been
previously investigated in the literature. However, to the best
of our knowledge, the idea of having a cooperation among
PEP has not yet been explored. Recalling that in most cases
access requests to data, or resources, are mediated through the
network we believe it is possible to place a shared enforcement
point for all services to use. However, unlike firewalls, this
component has to adhere to dynamic policies and requirements
of application-layer systems.
Moreover, letting applications such as DBMS instruct the
network may result in better and more dynamic network
management. For example, assume at time t of day d the
network infrastructure hosting the DBMS is congested and
can only handle 50 concurrent connections to DBMS due
to the global QoS requirements. Accordingly, the DBMS
administrator defines a policy to drop connection requests
beyond 50 and instructs the DBMS’PEP to limit the total
number of requests from a single source to 10. The issue with
this arrangement is that the UNSW network Admin has to trust
the DB Admin and the DBMS access control for this as such
temporary policies are application-dependent and are unknown
to the network components such as a firewall. Furthermore,
with application-level access control traffic still reaches the
network and attacks such as DoS may still target the network
hosting the DBMS.
Thirdly, dropping traffic associated with unauthorized re-
quests closer to the source would enable saving significant
traffic from flowing over the networks or Internet.
B. Proposed Approach
We propose designing a shareable enforcement point at
network-level, which is made available to application-layer
access control systems. The shareable enforcement point is
made available as a service and application or services need
to subscribe to use it. We coin the term ‘Policy Enforcement
as a Service’, or PEPS, for this security service.
Relying on traditional networks and deploying middle-boxes
for PEPS would be challenging. Specifically, policy conflict
resolution and performance management will be inefficient
and troublesome. However, the SDN architecture is well-suited
for such requirements since the controller composes policies
received by various applications and there is an on-going effort
to optimize this process with respect to dynamic and reactive
policies.
In SDN, the control plane entails both PR and PDP and the
data plane is equivalent to PEP in access control. In essence,
the SDN controller takes as input an extra set of policy for
PEPS, which may be defined by local or remote application-
layer access control systems. We design an SDN application
responsible to retrieve these policies and submitting them to
the network operating system.
C. Assumptions
We require the following assumptions to hold:
• The SDN controller and external SDN applications are
assumed to be secure and able to communicate securely
(e.g. using TLS).
• The SDN data plane is not compromised.
• The east and west bound communication link between
controllers in different networking domains is secure.
As mentioned in II-B, there is an over-expanding body of
literature exploring the security of SDN both at data plane
and control plane. Similar to various proposals that leverage
SDN to introduce novel services and applications (see §II-B),
we focus on our proposed system assuming the underlying
platform is reasonably reliable and secure.
D. Security Requirements
A PEPS solution should be designed and implemented such
that a malicious subscriber, whether in the same perimeter or
not, cannot:
• Violate the policy specifications of the service provider
through the remote policies.
• Violate the policy specifications of other services, which
use the enforcement point, whether in the same perimeter
or not.
Fig. 2: Abstract representation of Policy Transfer (PT) and
Remote Policy Transfer (RPT) in SDN networks deploying
PEPS. Switches in red and gree colour are effected by PT and
RPT, respectively.
• Affect the performance of the SDN controller itself. For
example, causing a DoS attack with constant update of
the remote policies.
E. Main Components and Requirements
Figure 2 shows the main components required in an SDN
network deploying PEPS. Policy Transfer is the standard
protocol used to define policies at application-layer (e.g. by
DBMS) for network-level SDN application. Similarly, Remote
Policy Transfer is used to translate application-layer policies
for a remotely located SDN network deploying PEPS. RPT
is securely exchanged over east and westbound link between
controllers and PT is exchanged over a secure connection.
Conflicting policies will result in one or more of the threats
mentioned in III-D. Therefore, we have to ensure the following
three requirements are met:
Requirement 1: Let P ′ be the set of policies for controller
C1, which is in domain D1 and governs over the set of
switches S. We define Pr as the PT for C1 and say: Pi is
a valid PT for P ′ if and only if P = {P ′ ∪ Pr} does not
violate the original policy specification P ′.
Requirement 2: ensures the remote policies do not conflict
with original policy specification. Therefore, we just replace
PT with RPT in Requirement 1.
Policy composition and conflict detection is an ongoing
challenge in Software-Defined-Network [12]. In order to pre-
vent adding further complications to this domain with PEPS,
it is best to restrict the capabilities of RPT at this time.
We postulate to restrict a PEPS service subscriber only to
submit RPT that relate to flow destined directly towards it
(e.g. DB in Domain B may only set RPT at domain A
for traffic flowing towards it’s own domain). Moreover, the
priority of rules set after conversion of RPT should always
be set below any matching policy set locally. Accordingly, we
define Requirement 3:
Requirement 3: Let P ′ be the set of policies for controller
C1, which is in domain D1 and governs over the set of
switches S and has been defined locally. We define Pr as the
remote policy for C1, which is generated according to RPT.
Then, having ∃Pri that ⊥ P ′i results in P ′i OVERRIDES Pri
in the final policy set P = {P ′ ∪ Pr}.
F. Practical Considerations
Multi-Table Pipeline: the data plane of SDN supports Flow
Table Pipeline (FTP) - introduced with OpenFlow specification
V1.1 to improve the flow processing performance [1]. The
pipeline consists of multiple flow tables. The incoming packet
is first matched with the first flow table, where the specified
actions could direct the packet to another flow table for further
processing of the packet. With this redirection mechanism, the
SDN control plane could build a logical single source directed
acyclic graph on the FTP for processing.
To implement non-conflicting remote policies we propose
customized use of FTP. All flow rules resulting from PT or
RPT should be added to the last flow table. This flow table
is directly managed by our purpose built PEPS APP. The
incoming flow to the switch is first-matched against all but
the last flow table (i.e. rules required by local policies are first
processed), and if a flow is still allowed, then it is passed to
the final flow table for processing. In other words,
Let FTP be a set of flow tables {FT1, FT2, ..., FTn}, FTi
for i < n generated according to the set of policies P ′ for
Controller C1, FTn set according to remote policy Pr for C1.
Then, an incoming packet Pckt is MATCHED against FTi
for i < n−1. The resulting Pckt′ is then MATCHED against
FTn.
This simplifies conflict resolution between local and remote
policies when using FTP.
Multiple PEPS SDN Application Instances: PEPS APP is
installed on networks deploying PEPS model of enforcement.
This application is responsible to retrieve PT and RPT and to
convert them into flow-table rules for submission to the con-
troller. PEPS should be securely connected to application-layer
services sending PT or RPT. Moreover, we must ensure PEPS
has minimum impact on the controller performance. Network-
Function-Virtualization (NFV) may be used to improve the
PEPS performance.
IV. PEPS IN PRACTICE
We now report on our prototype implementation of a PEPS-
enabled location-based access control. This section aims to
highlight the advantages of PEPS in practice and motivate
future work.
Location-based access controls rely on user’s location as
one of the attributes when making access decisions. There are
simple solutions to retrieve user’s location. For example, it is
possible to retrieve user’s location using the device integrated
peripherals such as GPS device. However, proof of presence is
a challenging aspect of location-based services, especially for
an indoor environment. As thoroughly discussed in [16], proof
of presence schemes can be categorized into beaconing-based,
context-based and distance-bounding based approaches. Most
of the proof of presence solutions are challenged for one or
more of the following reasons: requiring specialized hardware
or software, being immobile, unable to track movement in
real-time (or requiring extensive ongoing context scans either
by Data Provider or Data Requestor), being computationally
hard or infeasible, or being extremely privacy-invasive. Hence,
in practice, the adoption of these schemes by organizations is
challenging (e.g. [13], [26]).
Here, we propose and implement two alternative approaches
to ensure proof of presence and enforce location-based access
control using PEPS model. These schemes are not originally
built to replace existing solutions. Instead, we are interested
to use them as the first layer of defense (i.e. the outer layer of
defense in depth model). We define a scenario in which there
are two organizations both with SDN networks. The Data
Provider (DP) resides in network B, and the Data Requestor
(DR) is located in network A. We have implemented the
following scheme within a simulated environment using
Mininet 2.2.0 and Floodlight V.1 running as the SDN
controllers. The applications have been developed for this
controller and communicate over a secure TLS connection
with an open source database server, MariaDB, as the Data
Provider. We have integrated an extra module into MariaDB,
which mediates communication and coordinates with SDN
PEPS APP both in the local and remote networks.
PEPS-enabled location-based access control with real-
time location tracking
SDN-based location tracking: we use OpenFlow to retrieve
the location of users in real-time. This is a new approach to
track users and can be easily deployed without any specialized
hardware in SDN networks. Whenever a packet is received by
a switch, and it does not match any of its existing forwarding
rules then a packet in message containing the switch ID and
port ID is sent to the governing controller. The controller uses
this information to create a dynamic geo-location lookup table.
This table matches the user’s device IP to a switch port. The
network locations retrieved through switch ID can be matched
to different sections within the building. For example, in
Figure 3, Location 1 is associated to AP 1. An issue to consider
for wireless devices would be managing the signal coverage
that could mislead this scheme. This can be solved using
proper and careful positioning of these devices and signal
blocking solutions [5]. Indeed, the cost of performing such
is much lower than having specialized equipment for location
detection. Moreover, an important advantage of this scheme
is that unlike most proof of presence schemes, it is capable
of tracking the movement of the user around the locations in
real-time. It is possible to ensure that this scheme is secure
against IP Spoofing by setting a rule that only packets from a
specific IP address are forwarded from the switch port.
PEPS-based Access Enforcement: at this point, using the
above scheme, we build a location-based access control model
on top of our PEPS model. As depicted Figure 3, we require
an SDN-Location App (equivalent to PEPS APP referred to
earlier) installed on both DP and DR networks. An RPT, issued
by the DP, defines that any traffic destined to DP is dropped
unless the SDN-Location APP on the requesting side initiates a
valid session with the same application on the provider side. A
valid session requires that the user requesting data be located
by the SDN-Location App and is allowed to communicate
with DP in accordance with the rules extracted from RPT.
Fig. 3: Policy enforcement points that exist with PEPS are
depicted within a simplified location-based access control.
Without PEPS, the only PEP would be at DP.
Fig. 4: Representation of proposed ticketing protocol.
Only then a host is allowed to send a request for data. As
also depicted in Figure 3, compared to existing approached,
with our location-based access control model there are extra
network-level enforcement points both at source network and
host.
PEPS-enabled location-based access control with
location-tickets
The SDN-based Location Ticketing Scheme: it is possible to
use the same location detection scheme to generate location
tickets - rather than real-time tracking. The assumptions and
requirements for the location-ticket scheme is depicted in
Figure 5. Each controller and user are equipped with a public
and private key. The DR creates a Location Ticket Request
LTR containing the DR’s IP address, public key and time.
It digitally signs LTR and sends it to the SDN-Location App
running on top of the controller. The signature is verified, and
the IP address is compared with the one in the packet header.
If the IP is legitimate, the user’s location is retrieved using
the same approach mechanism described earlier. A Location
Ticket (LT) is then generated using the DR’s IP address, its
public key, time and location. LT is signed and sent along with
LT to the DR. The protocol is represented in Figure 4.
The proposed location ticket scheme binds the DR’s IP and
public key together. This helps to prevent one of the main
threats against proof of presence schemes such as Sybil Attack,
Fig. 5: Assumptions and requirements for the location-ticket
(LT) scheme.
where users create several fake identities in several locations
within the network.
PEPS-based Access Enforcement: the location-ticket
scheme facilitates the integration of PEPS with existing
application and services. Specifically, unlike the real-time
approach, there is no requirement of having SDN APP on both
DP and DR. A location ticket issued by SDN APP at DR may
be provided to any application or service requesting proof of
presence. The LT scheme also removes the requirement of
session establishment between remote controllers, which may
be more practical in many scenarios. We implemented the LT
scheme and sent location tickets along with access requests
to MariaDB as part of our prototype implementation.
A. Security and Performance Analysis
Performance Analysis: we simulated a network with 32
switches and four threads and sent location ticket requests to
the application running on top of the controller. Figure 5.a
shows the standard performance of the Floodlight controller
when not running the SDN-Location App. We then ran the
application and issued 1000 LTR. The controller performance
was steady and cumulative distribution function (CFD) showed
reasonable performance impact. However, as we increased the
LTR numbers the performance of the controller when handling
incoming flows degraded — compare Figure 5.b with 5.a.
This points us to the fact that it may be a better approach
to outsource demanding processes and use solutions such as
NFV.
Security Analysis: we include an analysis of SDN-based
location detection scheme. The security and performance of
PEPS is included in Section 5.
The scheme does not rely on user’s device peripherals and
is built on capabilities available at network infrastructure level.
Hence, it is much harder for an attacker to compromise the
system. Also, since this scheme does not rely on context
measurement information, it is secure against most recent
attacks including Context Guessing Attack [16]. Moreover,
this scheme could be used as a standalone solution — not for
proof of presence but actual location detection. If so, it allows
the protection of user’s privacy against service providers
that retrieve a huge amount of personal information when
retrieving the device location. However, the original scheme is
vulnerable to the Wormhole attack. It is possible to solve this
problem using authenticated Ping and various other network
Fig. 6: Abstract representation of progressive layered firewall
model.
delay measurement techniques. As further security analysis
and improvement is beyond the scope of this paper and we
leave this for our future work.
V. DISCUSSION
As illustrated in Figure 3, our PEPS-based access control
model allows having a defense in depth model of protection.
This change in access control enforcement has several ad-
vantages. For example, it allows network bandwidth to be
saved by blocking unauthroized requests at the source. It
also enables s of certain categories of attacks, where the
attack is based on challenge and response (e.g Port Scanning).
Evidently, dropping traffic before engaging services or systems
also facilitates protection against DoS threats.
PEPS enables having a more context-aware access control.
For example, if the remote enforcement is not blocking traffic
as expected then it could be considered as less trustworthy.
Accordingly, if controllers in different domains were to share
knowledge about this, they could block all, or specific, access
requests originated from the suspicious network until further
investigation (e.g. the controller may be compromised or the
PEPS APP may be malfunctioning).
We presume the aforementioned are only some of the
advantages of brought with a PEPS model of access control
enforcement. Specifically, the co-operation of domains in
access control could lead developing novel security services
never sought before. For example, we are investigating the
development of a PEPS-enabled inter-domain firewall system,
which gradually and progressively applies policies (see Figure
6 for an abstract representation). In other words, the RPT
mechanism used to define non-conflicting remote policies
could be used between firewall applications of SDN con-
trollers to progressively block unwanted traffic reaching an
organization network. It should be noted that, from a practical
point of view, such approach may not have been feasible with
existing firewall solutions without SDN and conceptualization
of PEPS. For example, firewalls may have been from different
providers and cooperation would not have been feasible. We
leave further investigation and exploration as future work.
PEPS is currently at its conception phase and requires
much further exploration and development before coming into
practice. Specifically, the translation of PT and RPT for the
network hosting PEPS is a challenging issue – e.g. which
forwarding devices will have to apply the remote policies in
(a) (b)
Fig. 7: Impact of SDN-Location APP on Floodlight controller.
Figure (a) is without the application running and Figure (b) is
with the application running.
the network. Moreover, the impacts of PEPS on network per-
formance and security threats associated with it require proper
analysis. We remind that our early performance evaluation is
not prohibitive (see §IV).
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we revisited the Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP) of access control. We introduced Policy Enforcement
Point as a Service, or PEPS, by leveraging the capabilities of
Software-Defined-Network (SDN). PEPS allows cooperation
of PEP among application-layer and network-layer services
either in the same network or remote domains. It enables
improving the security of application-layer services hosted
in networks and promises the development of innovative
collaborative network-based security services. Beyond con-
ceptualization, we made an early attempt to discuss practical
requirements for PEPS and reported on our prototype imple-
mentation. Detailed analysis of some of the security challenges
of PEPS and a more technical exploration on how to integrate
remote policy is left as our future work.
REFERENCES
[1] OpenFlow Switch Specification Version 1.1. Open Networking Founda-
tion.
[2] I. Alsmadi and D. Xu. Security of software defined networks: A survey.
Computers & Security, 53:79–108, 2015.
[3] R. Anderson. Security engineering. John Wiley & Sons, 2008.
[4] B. Anwer, T. Benson, N. Feamster, D. Levin, and J. Rexford. A
slick control plane for network middleboxes. In Proceedings of the
second ACM SIGCOMM workshop on Hot topics in software defined
networking, pages 147–148. ACM, 2013.
[5] D. D. Coleman, D. A. Westcott, B. E. Harkins, and S. M. Jackman.
Certified wireless security professional official study guide, 2010.
[6] J. Crampton and M. Huth. Towards an access-control framework for
countering insider threats. In Insider Threats in Cyber Security, pages
173–195. Springer, 2010.
[7] V. Dangovas and F. Kuliesius. Sdn-driven authentication and access
control system. In The International Conference on Digital Information,
Networking, and Wireless Communications (DINWC2014), pages 20–23.
The Society of Digital Information and Wireless Communication, 2014.
[8] S. C. David M. Upton. The danger from within. Harvard Business
Review, 2014.
[9] Y. Desmedt and A. Shaghaghi. Function-Based Access Control (FBAC):
From Access Control Matrix to Access Control Tensor. In Proceedings
of the 8th ACM CCS International Workshop on Managing Insider
Security Threats co-located with ACM CCS 2016. ACM, 2016.
[10] S. K. Fayazbakhsh, V. Sekar, M. Yu, and J. C. Mogul. Flowtags:
Enforcing network-wide policies in the presence of dynamic middlebox
actions. In Proceedings of the second ACM SIGCOMM workshop on
Hot topics in software defined networking, pages 19–24. ACM, 2013.
[11] H. H. Gharakheili, L. Exton, V. Sivaraman, J. Matthews, and C. Russell.
Third-party customization of residential internet sharing using sdn.
International Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference
(ITNAC), 2015.
[12] D. Kreutz, F. M. Ramos, P. Esteves Verissimo, C. Esteve Rothenberg,
S. Azodolmolky, and S. Uhlig. Software-defined networking: A com-
prehensive survey. proceedings of the IEEE, 103(1):14–76, 2015.
[13] W. Luo and U. Hengartner. Proving your location without giving up your
privacy. In Proceedings of the Eleventh Workshop on Mobile Computing
Systems & Applications, pages 7–12. ACM, 2010.
[14] D. M. F. Mattos, L. H. G. Ferraz, and O. C. M. B. Duarte. Authflow:
Authentication and access control mechanism for software defined
networking.
[15] S. A. Mehdi, J. Khalid, and S. A. Khayam. Revisiting traffic anomaly
detection using software defined networking. In Recent Advances in
Intrusion Detection, pages 161–180. Springer, 2011.
[16] M. Miettinen, N. Asokan, F. Koushanfar, T. D. Nguyen, J. Rios, A.-
R. Sadeghi, M. Sobhani, and S. Yellapantula. I know where you are:
Proofs of presence resilient to malicious provers. In Proceedings of the
10th ACM Symposium on Information, Computer and Communications
Security, pages 567–577. ACM, 2015.
[17] J. Park and R. Sandhu. The ucon abc usage control model. ACM
Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 7(1):128–
174, 2004.
[18] Z. A. Qazi, C.-C. Tu, L. Chiang, R. Miao, V. Sekar, and M. Yu. Simple-
fying middlebox policy enforcement using sdn. In ACM SIGCOMM
Computer Communication Review, volume 43, pages 27–38. ACM,
2013.
[19] R. S. Sandhu and P. Samarati. Access control: principle and practice.
Communications Magazine, IEEE, 32(9):40–48, 1994.
[20] S. Scott-Hayward, S. Natarajan, and S. Sezer. A survey of security in
software defined networks. Communications Surveys Tutorials, IEEE,
PP(99):1–1, 2015.
[21] S. Shin and G. Gu. Cloudwatcher: Network security monitoring using
openflow in dynamic cloud networks (or: How to provide security
monitoring as a service in clouds?). In Network Protocols (ICNP), 2012
20th IEEE International Conference on, pages 1–6. IEEE, 2012.
[22] S. Subramanya and B. K. Yi. Digital rights management. Potentials,
IEEE, 25(2):31–34, 2006.
[23] U. Toseef, A. Zaalouk, T. Rothe, M. Broadbent, and K. Pentikousis.
C-bas: Certificate-based aaa for sdn experimental facilities. In Software
Defined Networks (EWSDN), 2014 Third European Workshop on, pages
91–96. IEEE, 2014.
[24] P. Tsankov, S. Marinovic, M. T. Dashti, and D. Basin. Decentralized
composite access control. Springer, 2014.
[25] Ulfar Erlingsson, Keynote. Advances in Cryptology – ASIACRYPT
2011: 17th International Conference on the Theory and Application of
Cryptology and Information Security, Seoul, South Korea, December 4-
8, 2011, Proceedings. 2011.
[26] N.-C. Wu, M. Nystrom, T.-R. Lin, and H.-C. Yu. Challenges to global
rfid adoption. Technovation, 26(12):1317–1323, 2006.
[27] Yvo Desmedt, Keynote. Security and Privacy in Communication Net-
works: 7th International ICST Conference, SecureComm 2011, London,
September 7-9, 2011.
